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Sobhee, Sanjeev K.; Nath, Shyam. |
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign aid by exclusively explaining a donor’s motivation for foreign external assistance. The underlying framework focuses on recipients’ needs for foreign aid to address income inequality as and when growth occurs. A tax-subsidy policy is hypothesised in the manner advocated by optimal tax theory to effectively deal with inequity by minimizing the distortionary effects of income taxes. This framework is ultimately endogeneized in the recipient’s budget constraint, from which the donor derives the demand for foreign assistance. The outcome supports an inverted-U relationship between foreign aid and per capita income in the way postulated by the conventional Kuznets curve. Our postulate is empirically tested... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Foreign aid; Optimal taxation; Fiscal policy; International Relations/Trade; F35; H21; E62. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50163 |
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Anwar, Mumtaz; Michaelowa, Katharina. |
Variations of bilateral aid flows are difficult to explain on the basis of official development objectives or recipient need. At the example of US aid to Pakistan, this paper suggests alternative political economic explanations, notably the relevance of ethnic lobbying and the relevance of US business interests. Time series regressions for the period from 1980 to 2002 and logistic regressions based on votes for the Pressler and the Brown Amendment confirm the significance of these political economic determinants. While in case of the Pressler Amendment, the direct influence of population groups of Indian and Pakistani origins seems to have played a predominant role, the role of ethnic business lobbies appears to have dominated in the context of the Brown... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public Choice; Ethnic lobbying; Foreign aid; International Development; Political Economy; D70; F35. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26202 |
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