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RENT SEEKING AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: DO MEMBER COUNTRIES FREE RIDE ON LOBBYING? AgEcon
Furtan, William Hartley; Jensen, Maria Skovager; Sauer, Johannes.
The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others. This suggests a form of policy path dependency and leads to a suboptimal investment on lobbying of 7.5%.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Free-riding; Rent-seeking; Common Agricultural Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52649
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Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying? AgEcon
Furtan, William Hartley; Jensen, Maria Skovager; Sauer, Johannes.
The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others. This suggests a form of policy path dependency and leads to a suboptimal investment on lobbying of 7.5%.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Free-riding; Rent-seeking; Common Agricultural Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; Q18.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6600
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Horizontal coordination and free-riding in a group of certified organic crop growers: An empirical study of the Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organization in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa AgEcon
Gadzikwa, Lawrence; Lyne, Michael C.; Hendriks, Sheryl L..
This study investigated the prevalence and determinants of free-riding in the Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organization (EFO), a group of certified organic crop growers in South Africa, using data gathered in a census survey of its 151 partially and fully certified members. The computed free-riding index scores suggested that free-riding posed a serious threat to the group’s collective marketing efforts. Regression analysis showed that members who were male, poorly educated, aware of loopholes in the grading system, and who did not trust the buyer, were more likely to free-ride. In the longer term, the EFO should address institutionalized free-riding by issuing tradable ownership rights. In the short term, it must engage with the packhouse (buyer) to remove flaws in...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Smallholders; Organic crops; Collective marketing; Free-riding; Crop Production/Industries; Industrial Organization.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57014
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Competing Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games AgEcon
Kohler, Marion.
In Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union's discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearing that the insiders will try to do the same. In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions. The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose too much discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currency blocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policy...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Currency unions; International policy coordination; Free-riding; Coalition formation; Financial Economics; F33; F42.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26274
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Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep.
The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Environmental stocks; Dynamics; Free-riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; F12; F42; Q28.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6212
Registros recuperados: 5
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