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| Harrington, Winston; Krupnick, Alan J.; Alberini, Anna. |
| Transportation authorities have consistently failed to employ economic incentives on major roadways--i.e. time-of-day pricing or "congestion fees"--to internalize the costs of congestion. In principle at least, such tolls can easily be shown to increase social welfare by making motorists pay something closer to the full social costs of their driving decisions. In addition, recent advances in electronics make it possible to implement such fees fairly cheaply and non-intrusively. While these same authorities generally understand and acknowledge the case for using congestion fees, they also claim that their use is politically infeasible because too many motorists would suffer large increases in commuting costs. This is the puzzle: If congestion tolls truly do... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Congestion; HOT lanes; Freeways; Time-of-day pricing; Public Economics; R41. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10730 |
