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Bruinshoofd, W. Allard; Kool, Clemens J.M.. |
In this paper we investigate Dutch corporate liquidity management in general, and target adjustment behaviour in particular. To this purpose, we use a simple error correction model of corporate liquidity holdings applied to firm-level data for the period 1977-1997. We confirm the existence of long-run liquidity targets at the firm level. We also find that changes in liquidity holdings are driven by short-run shocks as well as the urge to converge towards targeted liquidity levels. The rate of target convergence is higher when we include more firm-specific information in the target. This result supports the idea that increased precision in defining liquidity targets associates with a faster observed rate of target convergence. It also suggests that the slow... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Corporate liquidity demand; Precautionary liquidity; C33; C43; E41; G3. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37606 |
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Suto, Megumi. |
In recent years, there has been a slow but steady change in ownership structures and corporate governance in Japan. As a result of economic stagnation, relations between companies characterised by cross-shareholdings and the main-bank system have become less rigid and institutional investors show increasing shareholder activism. This paper investigates the role of corporate pension funds in this process. Major trust banks and life insurance companies which act as trustees of pension funds are becoming more and more concerned with shareholder value. However, as will be demonstrated, this does not mean a transition from a relationship-oriented system to a pure market-based one. Instead, due to differences in the regulatory framework and schemes of corporate... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics; Corporate Finance and Governance; Financial Markets and Institutions; Financial Economics; G0; G3; N2. |
Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26220 |
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Guinnane, Timothy W.. |
Banks play a greater role in the German financial system than in the United States or Britain. Germanys large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the United States. Others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance. Many discussions distort the German Banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks, and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups. Tracing the historical development of the German banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Universal banking; German banks; German economic history; Financial Economics; G2; G3; N2. |
Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28447 |
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Ferri, Giovanni. |
Rating agencies' track record is good in developed countries but poor in emerging economies. Why? Given the almost-monopolistic structure of the industry, we conjecture that agencies might underinvest in information gathering. We propose an indicator quantifying the agencies' effort to gather information and assess whether greater effort affects rating levels. We detect: (i) absolute underinvestment for non-OECD sovereigns (less effort in spite of greater opaqueness); (ii) relative underinvestment for non-OECD firms compared with OECD ones (though the former receive a larger effort, more intense effort boosts firm ratings in non-OECD countries while depressing them in OECD countries). |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Sovereign risk; Credit ratings; Rating agencies’ effort; G2; G3. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43847 |
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