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| Peres, Carlos A.; School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK; C.Peres@uea.ac.uk. |
| Monitoring the distribution and abundance of hunted wildlife is critical to achieving sustainable resource use, yet adequate data are sparse for most tropical regions. Conventional methods for monitoring hunted forest-vertebrate species require intensive in situ survey effort, which severely constrains spatial and temporal replication. Integrating local ecological knowledge (LEK) into monitoring and management is appealing because it can be cost-effective, enhance community participation, and provide novel insights into sustainable resource use. We develop a technique to monitor population depletion of hunted forest wildlife in the Brazilian Amazon, based on the local ecological knowledge of rural hunters. We performed rapid interview surveys to estimate... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports |
Palavras-chave: Amazon; Brazil; Game; Harvesting; Hunting; Interviews; Large mammals. |
| Ano: 2015 |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353 |
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| Li, Geng. |
| On the basis of making certain assumption on the game situation of carrying our green marketing, this paper conducts game analysis on the green marketing choice among enterprises, the green marketing choice between enterprises and consumers, and the green marketing choice of consumers. Then this paper expounds the necessity of implementing green marketing as follows: the green marketing is the inevitable requirements of sustainable development of economy; the green marketing is the inevitable choice of green consumption mode; the green marketing is the inevitable results of legalization of environmental problems. The problems faced by the implementation of green marketing are analyzed as follows, first, the concept of green marketing has not yet been... |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Green marketing; Game; Countermeasures; China; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119686 |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game where there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental; Policy; Open; Economy; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; F13; Q28. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28364 |
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