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| Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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| Funke, Thomas; Klein, Peter G.. |
| The production of biofuels in many countries is largely driven by the government strategy and incentives that are in place. In South Africa the first round of the development of such a draft strategy took place in 2005 while the official stance on biofuels was finalized in December of 2007. During the policy development process various governmental departments had strategic goals and targets that they all were required to achieve. The achievement of these strategic targets and goals is also risky and the various departments that have some form of involvement in the biofuels industry need to decide on how much risk they are willing to take. This article sketches the game that the various governmental departments played as well as the risks that they were... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Biofuels; Game Theory; Government Strategy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95979 |
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| Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela. |
| We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475 |
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| Funke, Thomas; Klein, Peter G.. |
| The production of biofuels and the establishment of a biofuels industry in South Africa have largely been hampered by the structure, procedures and requirements as set out in the Industrial Biofuel Strategy. This article sketches the industry by means of a game theoretic representation. A model is developed that represents the rational strategies of various role players in the industry with respect to investor decision making. In reality this did not occur and the article develops and documents a variable, σ, which in turn helps to represent the current state of affairs. The study explains why current investment decisions in the industry have been made and why certain role players remain indifferent towards any commitment. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Biofuels; Game Theory; Biofuel Industry Investments; Agricultural Finance; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95978 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Duval, Romain; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54281 |
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| Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel. |
| We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370 |
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| Parker, Frederick. |
| Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Game Theory; Collective Action; Agricultural Economics; Theory of the Firm; Agribusiness; B5; C7; D7; L2; L3; Q1. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100691 |
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| Silveira, Luciana Torrezan; Burnquist, Heloisa Lee. |
| The basic hypothesis of this study is that producers do not realize, individually, the importance of adopting preventive measures, even aware of the economic risks for them and for the local economy, because outbreaks of some diseases are not frequent. Moreover, the presence of externalities makes the action of one producer regarding sanitary measures of the herd affect other producers in the same region, which cannot be perceived by them, either. This study aims to develop a theoretical procedure to infer about strategic decisions taken by producers to prevent animal disease in their herds, in face of the risk of contamination. The development of the model is based on the Game Theory, and the cost-benefit analysis as support for decision-making process.... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Foot-and-mouth disease; Meat sector; Benefit/cost analysis; Decision making theory; Agribusiness; C72; D81; Q18.. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60808 |
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| Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. |
| Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential stability” of a number of coalitions which are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even “potentially stable” even through an... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120048 |
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| Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike. |
| We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Depending on the parameters of the model two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C70; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50723 |
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| Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.; Johnson, D. Demcey. |
| One of the major trade policy problems identified by U.S. interests, including grower groups, traders, and policymakers, is that of pricing transparency. This has been a gnawing issue generally related to the pricing practices of competitor exporting countries with state trading enterprises (STEs). The transparency problem generally refers to the inability to observe rivals' terms of trade (including price, quality, credit, etc.) and is normally associated with commercial exporters competing against STE rivals. The perception being the less transparent competitors (STEs) would have a strategic advantage. A game theory model of bidding competition was developed to simulate the effects of information asymmetry amongst rivals. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Price Transparency; Strategic Bidding; Game Theory; Bayesian-Nash; State Trading Enterprises; Export Enhancement Program; Wheat; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23403 |
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| Johnson, Stanley R.. |
| Policy reforms increasing the roles of markets in agriculture and related institutional changes are occurring worldwide. These are accompanied by and related to rapid technical change, especially for information systems, biotechnology, and organizational mechanisms. Trends in farm size, integration, concentration, environmental sensitivity, organization and funding of research and development, and multinational business organization are among the observable consequences of these changes. With the evolving role of government, new institutions are emerging for shaping the strategic behavior of public and private sector agents. What are the characteristics of these institutions? Where will strategic behavior and interaction of agents have a critical impact on... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Policy; Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Strategic Behavior; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18512 |
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| Registros recuperados: 15 | |
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