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Registros recuperados: 56 | |
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Beghin, John C.; Dessus, Sebastien. |
The double-dividend debate evolves around the possibility (or not) of substituting environmental taxes for more distortionary taxes to reduce both pollution degradation and/or damages (the first dividend) and the excess burden of existing taxes (the second dividend), without eroding tax revenues. This paper contributes to the double dividend debate with a formal analysis and some numerical evidence emphasizing trade and environmental distortions. The substitution of environmental taxes for trade distortions has been neglected in the double-dividend debate, which has centered on labor market distortions. Conditions for the existence of a double dividend are derived for different characterizations of preferences and policy menus. We empirically explore the... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Double dividend; Trade and environment; Piecemeal reform; Policy coordination; Chile; International Relations/Trade; F13; Q28; H21. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18569 |
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Parry, Ian W.H.; Bento, Antonio M.. |
This paper uses analytical and numerical models to illustrate how the presence of other distortions within the transport system changes the overall welfare effect of a congestion tax. These other distortions include a transit fare subsidy, congestion on competing (unpriced) routes, accident externalities, gasoline taxes, and pollution externalities. Each of these pre-existing distortions can substantially alter the welfare effect of a congestion tax that would be predicted by a first-best analysis. If congestion taxes encourage travel on other congested routes, they can produce sizeable indirect welfare losses. In addition, induced reductions in the demand for gasoline can lead to substantial welfare losses when, as appears to be the case for European... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Congestion tax; Welfare effect; Transit subsidy; Gasoline tax; Accidents; Pollution; Public Economics; R41; H21; H23. |
Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10678 |
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Parry, Ian W.H.. |
Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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Parry, Ian W.H.. |
Certain types of expenditure--e.g. mortgage interest and medical insurance- receive favorable tax treatment and are effectively subsidized relative to other (non-tax-favored) expenditures. Labor taxes (e.g. income taxes) can therefore produce efficiency losses by distorting the allocation of consumption, in addition to distorting the labor market. Using evidence on the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates, a seminal study by Feldstein (1999) estimates that the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB) could exceed unity, when the effects of tax deductions are taken into account. This is several times larger than in previous studies of the MEB that focus exclusively on labor market effects. This paper develops a "disaggregated" approach... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Welfare costs; Tax system; Tax deductions; Simulations; Political Economy; H21; H43. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10801 |
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Jou, Jyh-Bang; Lee, Tan. |
This article compares the effects of various fiscal policies on choices of development timing and capital intensity when rents on housing follow geometric Brownian motion with those when rents follow arithmetic Brownian motion. These policy instruments include fees on capital, housing, and land, and taxes on urban income, and properties both before and after development. Regardless of the motion of rents, when one choice is fixed, the effects of these policy instruments on the other choice are qualitatively the same. When the two choices are determined endogenously, although these policy instruments exhibit the same qualitative effect on the choice of development timing, they may exhibit different effects on the choice of capital intensity if rents on... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Capital intensity; Development Timing; Fees; Taxation; Real Options; International Development; G13; H21; H23; R52. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10352 |
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Parry, Ian W.H.; Small, Kenneth A.. |
This paper develops an analytical framework for assessing the second-best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution, congestion, and accident externalities, and interactions with the broader fiscal system. We provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the US and the UK under a wide variety of parameter scenarios, with the gasoline tax substituting for a distorting tax on labor income. Under our central parameter values, the second-best optimal gasoline tax is $1.01/gal for the US and $1.34/gal for the UK. These values are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions. The congestion externality is the largest component in both nations, and the higher optimal tax for the UK is due mainly to a higher assumed... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Gasoline tax; Pollution; Congestion; Accidents; Fiscal interactions; Public Economics; H21; H23; R48. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10461 |
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Ferraro, Paul J.; Simpson, R. David. |
Intact ecosystems provide important global services. Many valuable ecosystems are located in low-income countries in which citizens are not in a position to provide global public goods gratis. To address this problem, international conservation and development donors have been making substantial investments in habitat conservation. Among the more common conservation schemes are interventions aimed at encouraging commercial activities that produce ecosystem services as joint products. We argue that it would be more cost-effective to pay for conservation performance directly. We use a simple yet general model to establish three conclusions. First, the overall cost of conservation is least when direct payments are employed. Second, the donor will generally... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Conservation; Cost-effective; Incentives; Agricultural Finance; H21; Q28. |
Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10800 |
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Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander. |
This paper reviews the Latin American experience with highway privatization during the last decade. Based on evidence from Argentina, Colombia and Chile, we find that private financing of new highways freed up fewer public resources than expected because public funds were often diverted to bail out franchise holders. Furthermore, many of the standard benefits of privatization did not materialize because of pervasive contract renegotiations. We argue that the disappointing performance of highway privatization in Latin America was due to two fundamental design flaws. First, countries followed a privatize now, regulate later approach. Second, most concessions were awarded as a fixed-term franchise, thereby creating a demand for guarantees and contract... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Cost-of-funds; Flexibility; Franchising; Government subsidies; Present-value-of-revenue (PVR); Regulation; Renegotiation; Public Economics; H21; L51; L91. |
Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28456 |
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Loizides, John; Vamvoukas, George. |
This paper seeks to examine if the relative size of government (measured as the share of total expenditure in GNP can be determined to Granger cause the rate of economic growth, or if the rate of economic growth can be determined to Granger cause the relative size of government. For this purpose, we first use a bivariate error correction model within a Granger causality framework, as well as adding unemployment and inflation (separately) as explanatory variables, creating a simple ‘trivariate’ analysis for each of these two variables. The combined analysis of bivariate and trivariate tests offers a rich menu of possible causal patterns. Using data on Greece, UK and Ireland, the analysis shows: i) government size Granger causes economic growth in all... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Public sector growth; Economic growth; Bivariate and trivariate causality tests; Error correction modeling; H21. |
Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37515 |
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Sobhee, Sanjeev K.; Nath, Shyam. |
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign aid by exclusively explaining a donor’s motivation for foreign external assistance. The underlying framework focuses on recipients’ needs for foreign aid to address income inequality as and when growth occurs. A tax-subsidy policy is hypothesised in the manner advocated by optimal tax theory to effectively deal with inequity by minimizing the distortionary effects of income taxes. This framework is ultimately endogeneized in the recipient’s budget constraint, from which the donor derives the demand for foreign assistance. The outcome supports an inverted-U relationship between foreign aid and per capita income in the way postulated by the conventional Kuznets curve. Our postulate is empirically tested... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Foreign aid; Optimal taxation; Fiscal policy; International Relations/Trade; F35; H21; E62. |
Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50163 |
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Ross, Matthias. |
This paper extends an economic geography model by tariffs to analyze their impact on welfare and sustainability of agglomerations. Policies with and without cooperation are compared, with the goal of maximizing aggregated welfare in the former and regional welfare in the latter case. The main result is that under cooperation poorer regions are worse off in two respects. In the short-run they loose even more welfare and in the long-run sustainable agglomerations in richer regions get more likely. Thus, although cooperation could generate aggregated welfare gains the potential losers face even in the short-run no incentive to remove tariffs unless they are compensated appropriately, for instance by transfers. In this sense transfers from the rich to the poor... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Optimal tariffs; Optimal taxation; Policy coordination; Economic geography; Economic integration; Political Economy; F13; H21; F42; R12; F15. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26154 |
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Registros recuperados: 56 | |
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