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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Dimitrov, Dinko (2) Chin Sung, Shao (1) Sung, Shao Chin (1) Palavra-chave C71 (2) Hedonic Games (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Additive Preferences (1) C63 (1) C70 (1) Coalition Formation (1) Computational Complexity (1) Core (1) D02 (1) D70 (1) D71 (1) Monotonicity (1) NP-complete (1) NP-hard (1) Stable Sets (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2011 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games AgEcon Dimitrov, Dinko; Chin Sung, Shao. We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Core; Hedonic Games; Monotonicity; Stable Sets; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C71. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115722 Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games AgEcon Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko. We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C70; C71; D02; D70; D71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46655 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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