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| Wolf, Christopher A.; Hadrich, Joleen C.; Vandehaar, M.J.. |
| Accelerated prepubertal growth rates can lower heifer raising costs but may put heifers at risk for impaired mammary development and have been found to be detrimental decreased to milk production in the first lactation. The tradeoff between heifer raising costs and milk production loss is examined in a capital budgeting model. Monthly annuity net present value of a heifer investment through the first lactation is assessed for heifers calving at 20, 22, 24, 26 and 28 months of age. A 24 mo AFC base case strategy with 9009.5 kg subsequent first lactation milk yields $7.34 in returns per month. Accelerated growth resulted in higher returns ($12.77/mo for 20 mo AFC; $9.86/mo for 22 mo AFC) when milk production is not affected as total raising costs decline... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Heifer growth; Economics; Investment; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7429 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| As dairy farms grow and specialize in milking cows, raising replacement heifers is increasingly outsourced. Perhaps the largest challenge of outsourcing the heifer enterprise involves quality, measured as milk production potential, and the possibility for moral hazard due to hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms to provide incentives for the heifer grower to achieve desired growth rates, and enable the return of the heifer to the dairy farm on an accelerated time frame, without sacrificing quality. To mitigate incentive asymmetries, bonuses and deductions are proposed. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99109 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because of hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms which provide incentives for the custom heifer grower to perform accelerated growth without heifers becoming over-conditioned. In order to provide incentives to custom growers, heifers returned to the dairy farm should be compared in performance to other heifers of similar age. We solve for the price paid per pound of gain, price paid for inch... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farm management; Production economics; Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6077 |
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