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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Rubbelke, Dirk T.G. (3) Finus, Michael (1) Markandya, Anil (1) Rive, Nathan (1) Palavra-chave Impure Public Goods (3) Q54 (3) Ancillary Benefits (2) Climate Policy (2) Environmental Economics and Policy (2) H87 (2) Abatement Technology (1) Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy (1) C72 (1) CDM (1) Coalition Formation (1) Conditional Transfers (1) Food Security and Poverty (1) Game Theory (1) H23 (1) H41 (1) Lancastrian Characteristics Approach (1) O33 (1) Transfers (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2008 (3) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy AgEcon Markandya, Anil; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Analyses of public goods regularly address the case of pure public goods. However, a large number of (international) public goods exhibit characteristics of different degrees of publicness, i.e. they are impure public goods. In our analysis of transfers helping to overcome the inefficient provision of such goods, we therefore apply the Lancastrian characteristics approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider the case of a continuum of impure public goods. We employ the example of international conditional transfers targeting to overcome suboptimal low climate protection efforts by influencing the abatement technology choice of countries. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Impure Public Goods; Lancastrian Characteristics Approach; Conditional Transfers; Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44226 Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection AgEcon Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.; Rive, Nathan. In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a developing and an industrialized region, both of which independently seek to maximize their utility – a function of private consumption, domestic air quality, and global climate protection. They do so by distributing their finite expenditures across (1) the aggregate consumption good, (2) end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, and (3) greenhouse gas abatement. Based on our analytical findings, we develop two sets of simulations for China in which we vary the rate of the CDM transfer. The simulations differ by the assumption of China’s domestic air quality policy – the first assumes a... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; CDM; Climate Policy; Impure Public Goods; Transfers; Abatement Technology; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Security and Poverty; Q54; H23; H41; O33. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46650 Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy AgEcon Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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