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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| Sommerville, Matthew M.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; m.sommerville06@imperial.ac.uk; Jones, Julia P. G.; School of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Bangor; julia.jones@bangor.ac.uk; Milner-Gulland, E. J.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; e.j.milner-gulland@imperial.ac.uk. |
| Over the past decade, “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) have received a great deal of attention as a natural-resource management approach. We propose a revised definition and framework for PES implementation that focuses on the use of positive incentives as the philosophy behind PES and conditionality as the method for influencing behaviors. We note the importance of additionality of PES interventions to justify their value in a wider context. Finally, we highlight the need to understand the local institutional context in terms of the characteristics of buyers, sellers, and their relationship for implementation to be effective. Our framework acts as a platform to begin examining how the variety of options for structuring PES... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Insight |
Palavras-chave: Additionality; Conditional; Ecosystem services; Environmental management; Incentives; Institutions; Monitoring; Transactions. |
| Ano: 2009 |
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| Hanna, Susan S; Oregon State University; susan.hanna@oregonstate.edu. |
| Institutions are the mechanisms that integrate the human and ecological spheres. This paper discusses the institutional challenge of integrating salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) ecosystems and human systems in ways that effectively promote resilience. Salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin demonstrates the challenge. Despite the comprehensive scope of Basin salmon management, it has a number of problems that illustrate the difficulties of designing institutions for ecosystem and human system resilience. The critical elements of salmon ecosystem management are incentives and transaction costs, and these comprise a large piece of missing institutional infrastructure. Once the focus is placed on incentives and costs, a number of different management strategies... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Synthesis |
Palavras-chave: Columbia River Basin; Ecosystems; Human systems; Incentives; Institutions; Resilience; Salmon; Transaction costs. |
| Ano: 2008 |
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| Kerr, William A.. |
| The European Union is attempting to have the protection of geographic indicators strengthened in the WTO. There may be sufficient rents and other benefits available to justify this strategy in the negotiations. To achieve its rent-seeking goals, however, the European Union needs allies at the negotiations. It has been courting developing countries by touting the benefits of geographic indicators for their products. For most products originating in developing countries, the opportunities for rents will first have to be created, a resource-intensive and problematic activity. Further, even if rents can be created in the short run, the forces of competition are likely to erode them. Scarce resources might be better utilized on other development strategies that... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Developing countries; Geographic indicators; Incentives; Rent seeking; Sustainable development; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23827 |
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| Leonard, Kenneth L.; Masatu, Melkiory C.. |
| Medicine is a professional pursuit, and even in developing countries professionalism should lead at least some practitioners to care for their patients despite the absence of direct incentives to do so. Even if practitioners do not behave as professionals, what is the extent of latent professionalism, in which socialization in the profession conditions health workers to respond to a demand for professionalism even if they do not normally act as professionals? How many health care workers in developing countries act as professionals all the time and what will happen if health services turn toward remuneration schemes in which health workers are paid by the output or outcome? We examine the behavior of 80 practitioners from Arusha region of Tanzania for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentives; Quality; Health care; Professionalism; Tanzania; Health Economics and Policy; I1; O1; O2. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42883 |
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| Gillingham, Kenneth; Newell, Richard G.; Palmer, Karen L.. |
| Energy efficiency policies are a primary avenue for reducing carbon emissions, with potential additional benefits from improved air quality and energy security. We review literature on a broad range of existing non-transportation energy efficiency policies covering appliance standards, financial incentives, information and voluntary programs, and government energy use (building and professional codes are not included). Estimates indicate these programs are likely to have collectively saved up to 4 quads of energy annually, with appliance standards and utility demand-side management likely making up at least half these savings. Energy Star, Climate Challenge, and 1605b voluntary emissions reductions may also contribute significantly to aggregate energy... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Energy efficiency policy; Appliance standards; Information; Incentives; Voluntary programs; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q48; Q41. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10477 |
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| Guignet, Dennis; Alberini, Anna. |
| Policy has increasingly shifted towards economic incentives and liability attenuation for promoting cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated sites, but little is known about the effectiveness of such policies. An example of such legislation is State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs), which were established in the US in the 1990s and to date have been implemented in almost every state. We examine Baltimore properties that participated in the Maryland VCP from its inception in 1997 to the end of 2006. Specifically, we examine what type of properties tend to participate in these programs, how these properties compare to other eligible but non-participating sites, and what is the redevelopment potential of VCP properties and implications towards open space... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Brownfields; Contaminated Sites; Voluntary Cleanup Programs; Incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy; R14; Q58; K32. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46548 |
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| Olesen, Henrik Ballebye. |
| This paper analyzes a contract between farmers and a large company in the Danish food industry, Danisco Foods. Production of green peas requires a very accurate coordination, which is obtained through centralized decision-making. The contract is based on a tournament system providing risk sharing between the farmers. General problems from the contract theory such as hold up, moral hazard, risk sharing and screening are analyzed. The paper illustrates the tradeoffs between these problems in design of contracts. By negotiating the contract through a pea-growers association, the farmers gain some bargaining power. Thus the farmers can ensure that Danisco Foods uses only one contract for all farmers. This paper analyzes the consequences of the farmers'... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Contract theory; Coordination; Incentives; Risk sharing; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24200 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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