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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Bierbrauer, Felix (1) Naghavi, Alireza (1) Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. (1) Palavra-chave Incomplete Contracts (2) D02 (1) D23 (1) D82 (1) F23 (1) Growth (1) H41 (1) Heterogeneous Firms (1) Industrial Organization (1) Industry Dynamics (1) L23 (1) L51 (1) Mechanism Design (1) O31 (1) O43 (1) Offshoring (1) Public Economics (1) Public goods (1) Regulation (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2009 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Firm Heterogeneity, Contract Enforcement, and the Industry Dynamics of Offshoring AgEcon Naghavi, Alireza; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P.. We develop an endogenous growth model to study the long run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm’s production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one. On the positive side, we show that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of offshoring has favorable implications for economic growth. Yet, offshoring induced by a higher bargaining power of the upstream division can hamper growth: while there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is a non-monotonic relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Offshoring; Heterogeneous Firms; Incomplete Contracts; Growth; Industry Dynamics; Industrial Organization; D23; F23; L23; O31; O43. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52542 On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods AgEcon Bierbrauer, Felix. The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Regulation; Public Economics; D02; D82; H41; L51. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55325 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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