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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Cordero Salas, Paula (3) Palavra-chave Contracts (3) D86 (3) Incomplete enforcement (3) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (3) Institutions (3) International Development (3) K12 (3) L14 (3) O12 (3) Distribution (2) Industrial Organization (2) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Bargaining (1) Bargaining group (1) Carbon sequestration (1) Climate change (1) Development. (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Experiments (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2009 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última The Role of Market Power in Agricultural Contracts AgEcon Cordero Salas, Paula. I study the economic consequences of shifting bargaining power in relational contracts through interventions such as the formation of a Bargaining Group (BG) for the side of sellers in a market where buyers traditionally hold significant market power. Existing theories of relational contracts predict that such a power transfer will have no impact on market efficiency. In contexts where enforcement institutions are weak, a standard assumption from existing theories of relational contracts - the existence of an enforceable base payment - may not hold. In this case, I show that a transfer of bargaining power can erode market efficiency in a dynamic relational contracting environment, which contradicts findings from existing models of relational contracting.... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Bargaining group; Distribution; Institutions; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q13.. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49376 Designing Contracts for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation AgEcon Cordero Salas, Paula. Reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) has been identified as a cost effective element of the post-Kyoto strategy to achieve long-term climate objectives. The success of REDD depends primarily on the design and implementation of a financial mechanism that provides land-holders sufficient incentives to participate in a REDD scheme. This paper proposes relational contracting as a more appropriate framework for analyzing proposed REDD incentive regimes rather than that of complete contracting enforcement because relational contracting relies upon mutual self-enforcement in a repeated transaction framework, which better suits the stylized facts of REDD. We characterize the optimal REDD relational contract and provide the... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Carbon sequestration; Climate change; Institutions; Development.; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; Land Economics/Use; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q54; Q56. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61129 Bargaining Power in Relational Contracts: An Experimental Study AgEcon Cordero Salas, Paula. This paper provides experimental evidence of the economic impact from shifting bargaining power in relational contracts. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers (agents) and the enforceability of the contract. I find that the vast majority of contracts take the form of efficiency wage contracts instead of contingent performance contracts when enforcement is partially incomplete and sellers have more bargaining power than buyers. The total contracted and actual compensation increase with the bargaining power of the sellers. However, sellers' profits are found to increase only if a part of the total payment is third-party enforceable. In this case, observed surplus and efficiency are lower than predictions. When no... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contracts; Incomplete enforcement; Bargaining; Experiments; Distribution; Institutions; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; D86; K12; L14; O12; Q13. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103579 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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