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Castilla, Carolina. |
There is evidence that some multi-person households may withhold income transfers, such as bonuses, gifts, and cash transfers, from other members of the household (Ashraf (2009); Vogler and Pahl, (1994)). In this paper, I show that the incentives to hide income under incomplete information regarding the quantity of resources available to the household differ for three different household resource management structures. I illustrate this with a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, one spouse receives a monetary transfer that is unobserved by her spouse, and she must decide whether to reveal or to hide it. In the second stage, spouses bargain over the allocation of resources between a household good and private expenditure. The three models differ in... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Incomplete information; Household bargaining; Resource management systems; Demand and Price Analysis; Labor and Human Capital; D13; D82; J12. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61607 |
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