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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Dellink, Rob B. (2) Breton, Michele (1) Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray (1) Germain, Marc (1) Karp, Larry S. (1) Magnus, Alphonse (1) Marrouch, Walid (1) Nagashima, Miyuki (1) Sacheti, Sandeep (1) Sbragia, Lucia (1) Tulkens, Henry (1) Weikard, Hans-Peter (1) Zaccour, Georges (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (6) International Environmental Agreements (6) International Relations/Trade (3) Q54 (3) C72 (2) F42 (2) Adaptation (1) C73 (1) Capital Accumulation (1) Climate Change (1) Climate Change Modelling (1) Coalition Formation (1) Coalition Stability (1) D62 (1) Dynamic Core Solution (1) Dynamics (1) Environmental stocks (1) F12 (1) F53 (1) Free-riding (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (6) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (2) 2007 (1) 1997 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep. The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Environmental stocks; Dynamics; Free-riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; F12; F42; Q28. Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6212 Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements AgEcon Breton, Michele; Sbragia, Lucia; Zaccour, Georges. In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with partial... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Non‐Cooperative Dynamic Game; Coalition Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C73; Q53. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6231 Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-Dimensional International Environmental Model AgEcon Germain, Marc; Tulkens, Henry; Magnus, Alphonse. This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stock Pollutant; Capital Accumulation; International Environmental Agreements; Dynamic Core Solution; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58; F42; F53; O21. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50467 Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions AgEcon Nagashima, Miyuki; Dellink, Rob B.. Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Change Modelling; International Environmental Agreements; Non-cooperative Game Theory; Technology Spillovers; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; O33; Q54. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7442 International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation AgEcon Marrouch, Walid; Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray. We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more effective the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Adaptation; Coalition Formation; Climate Change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q59. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102572 Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations AgEcon Weikard, Hans-Peter; Dellink, Rob B.. This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stability of Coalitions; International Environmental Agreements; Partition Function Approach; Sharing Rules; Optimal Transfers; Renegotiations; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C72; D62; H41; H77. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6293 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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