|
|
|
|
|
| Kushnir, Alexey. |
| Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker has “typical” commonly known preferences with probability close to one and “atypical” idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Signaling; Cheaptalk; Matching; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C78; D80; J44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96837 |
| |
|
|
| Nelson, Paul A.; Monson, Terry. |
| Research funding as a measure of faculty productivity has not been incorporated into previous studies of academic salary profiles. Here, we examine the effects of research funding, as well as publications, at a mid-sized, non-unionized, science and engineering-focused, American public university. Our conclusions are that research funding is more significant than publications in explaining salary differences for engineering and hard science faculty members; in contrast, only publications contribute to salary differences for faculty members in other disciplines. In addition, returns to seniority are generally nil or negative, which corroborate most other studies of this nature. Higher graduate and lower undergraduate student credit hour generation are... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Human capital; Specific human capital; Professional labor markets; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; J24; J41; J44. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50284 |
| |
|
|
|
