Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Mondello, Gerard (3) Palavra-chave CERCLA (3) Environment (3) Environment Law (3) Environmental Liability (3) Ex-Ante Regulation (3) Ex-Post Liability (3) Judgment-Proof (3) K0 (3) K32 (3) Q01 (3) Q58 (3) Strict Liability (3) Health Economics and Policy (2) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (2) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94621 Hazardous Activities and Civil Strict Liability: The Regulator’s Dilemma AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the “capped strict liability scheme”. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101299 Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94736 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco