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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Mondello, Gerard (3) Bayer, Patrick (1) Gerard, Mondello (1) Hanemann, W. Michael (1) Hoffmann, Sandra A. (1) Pozen, David E. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave K0 (6) K32 (4) Q01 (4) Q58 (4) Strict Liability (4) CERCLA (3) Environment (3) Environment Law (3) Environmental Liability (3) Ex-Ante Regulation (3) Ex-Post Liability (3) Judgment-Proof (3) Health Economics and Policy (2) Accident Model (1) Ambiguity Theory (1) Compensation (1) D31 (1) D63 (1) Damages (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2011 (1) 2010 (2) 2005 (1) 2003 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94621 Hazardous Activities and Civil Strict Liability: The Regulator’s Dilemma AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the “capped strict liability scheme”. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101299 Torts and the Protection of "Legally Recognized" Interests AgEcon Hoffmann, Sandra A.; Hanemann, W. Michael. The law of torts plays an important role in completing the legal property rights system by defining the extent to which property is protected from harm. It does this by defining the kinds of interests that will be recognized and protected from harm by the courts, the duty of care owed these recognized interests by others, and the manner in which they will be protected through monetary compensation, restitution, or injunction. Together, these three elements of torts define a right in the "bundle of rights" that constitute property. In this paper, we develop a systematic approach to formalizing the nature of the property rights protected by tort law. We use this approach to reexamine the literature on compensation for nonpecuniary damages. This reexamination... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Torts; Property rights; Liability; Compensation; Damages; Insurance; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D31; D63; K0; K13. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10472 The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus Private Management AgEcon Bayer, Patrick; Pozen, David E.. This paper uses data on juvenile offenders released from correctional facilities in Florida to explore the effects of facility management type (private for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and public county-operated) on recidivism outcomes and costs. The data provide detailed information on individual characteristics, criminal and correctional histories, judge-assigned restrictiveness levels, and home zipcodes allowing us to control for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities far better than any previous study. Relative to all other management types, for-profit management leads to a statistically significant increase in recidivism, but, relative to nonprofit and state-operated facilities, for-profit facilities operate at a... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Juvenile Crime; Juvenile correctional facilities; Recidivism; Prison privatization; Provision of public goods; Nonprofit; For-profit; Public; Labor and Human Capital; H0; H1; H4; K0; K4. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28484 The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A « Trompe l'œil » Perspective AgEcon Gerard, Mondello. This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up liability regime on their capacity to provide the highest level of safety is ineffective. This demonstration lies on two components. The first one gathers some results drawn from literature that introduces uncertainty. The second one takes into consideration the beliefs of agents and their aversion to ambiguity. The model applies uncertainty to the level of maximum damage. This demonstration reinforces the previous result. Hence, both regimes apply on specific tort question and comparing... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Negligence Rule; Ambiguity Theory; Uncertainty; Accident Model; Risk and Uncertainty; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121910 Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94736 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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