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| Rohith, B.K.; Chandrakanth, Mysore G.. |
| The economic and institutional dimensions of water users cooperative (WUC) societies have been analyzed with regards to performance, membership and transaction costs in forming organization in the Cauvery basin of Karnataka. Field data have been collected from presidents and members of 30 WUC societies in Tirumakudalu Narasipura taluk of Mysore, Karnataka. Using cluster analysis, these have been grouped into (i) well performing, (ii) moderately performing, and (iii) poorly performing WUC societies. To understand institutional and economic dimensions, the selected WUC societies have been grouped based on command area, membership and conjunctive use of water. The odds ratio determined using logit model has indicated that for every one chance of not willing... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Water users cooperative society; Institutional economics; Water institutions; Cauvery Basin; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q13; Q15; Q25; K00. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118231 |
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| Caballero, Ricardo J.; Cowan, Devin N.; Engel, Eduardo M.R.A.; Micco, Alejandro. |
| Microeconomic flexibility, by facilitating the process of creative-destruction, is at the core of economic growth in modern market economies. The main reason for why this process is not infinitely fast is the presence of adjustment costs, some of them technological, others institutional. Chief among the latter is labor market regulation. While few economists would object to such a view, its empirical support is rather weak. In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and find strong evidence for it. We use a new sectoral panel for 60 countries and a methodology suitable for such a panel. We find that job security regulation clearly hampers the creative-destruction process, especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced. Moving from the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Microeconomic rigidities; Creative-destruction; Job security regulation; Adjustment costs; Rule of law; Productivity growth; Labor and Human Capital; E24; J23; J63; J64; K00. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28486 |
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| Dharmapala, Dhammika; Hoffmann, Sandra A.; Schwartz, Warren. |
| The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, misperception, or error) all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both injurers and victims. This paper generalizes the standard model to consider situations in which one party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's effort or cost of taking precaution. If the injurer's care affects the victim's precaution costs (but not vice versa), most of the standard results continue to hold (except for strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence). If the victims precaution affects the injurers costs of care (but not vice versa), only strict liability with a defense of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Law and economics; Tort laws; Risk and Uncertainty; K13; K00. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10626 |
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