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| Brennan, Timothy J.; Boyd, James. |
| This paper explores ways in which economic analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. The paper begins with a description of the stranded cost problem, its magnitude, and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. We then turn to an analysis of contracts in order to understand whether there is, or should be, a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. The paper also argues that efficient approaches to electricity deregulation will rely on more than an analysis of contracts. In particular, the politics... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Takings; Electric utilities; Contracts; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10688 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino. |
| When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370 |
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| Boyd, James. |
| Progress toward electricity market deregulation has brought controversy over whether or not utilities are entitled to compensation for "stranded costs," i.e., costs utilities will not be able to recover due to the advent of competition in their markets. This paper uses a legal and economic analysis of contracts to address the desirability of utility cost recovery. First, underlying principles of law are reviewed to determine whether or not there is a legal presumption of recovery. Then, the analysis considers whether or not an implicit "regulatory compact" between utilities and regulators follows from principles in the economic analysis of law, particularly theories of efficient breach and implicit contracts. The paper concludes that recovery should occur... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Contracts; Electric utilities; Environmental Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10803 |
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| Hipp, Janie S.; Francis, Harriet F.. |
| Agriculture has seen a steady movement toward the increased use of contracts. Agricultural contracts now guide the interrelationships of parties throughout the modern production system, extending well beyond the livestock sector. With this predominance come new issues that require us to reexamine contract theory and the roles of the parties. This review examines legislation, regulations, and recent court rulings in seemingly unrelated areas that have specific relationships to the development of contracts in production agriculture: environmental law and labor law. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Environment; Labor; Law; Liability; Relationships; Risk; D23; D86; K12; K31; K32. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43508 |
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