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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Bhattacharya, Utpal (1) Cornelli, Francesca (1) Daouk, Hazem (1) Enriques, Luca (1) Guinnane, Timothy W. (1) Harris, Ron (1) Kominek, Zbigniew (1) Lamoreaux, Naomi R. (1) Ljungqvist, Alexander (1) Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent (1) Mais... Palavra-chave K22 (4) Financial Economics (3) G34 (2) O16 (2) Board Neutrality (1) Boards of Directors (1) CEO Turnover (1) Civil law (1) Common law (1) Corporate Governance (1) Corporation (1) Cost of capital (1) Emerging markets (1) Enforcement (1) G15 (1) G18 (1) G24 (1) G3 (1) G32 (1) G38 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (4) Ano 2010 (2) 2009 (1) 2007 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach AgEcon Enriques, Luca. This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Takeover Bid Directive; Board Neutrality; Mandatory Bid Rule; Market for Corporate Control; Financial Economics; K22; G34; G38. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60748 When No Law is Better than a Good Law AgEcon Bhattacharya, Utpal; Daouk, Hazem. This paper argues, both theoretically and empirically, that sometimes no securities law may be better than a good securities law that is not enforced. The first part of the paper formalizes the sufficient conditions under which this happens for any law. The second part of the paper shows that a specific securities law - the law prohibiting insider trading - may satisfy these conditions. The third part of the paper takes this prediction to the data. We find that the cost of equity actually rises when some countries enact an insider trading law, but do not enforce it. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Insider trading; Cost of capital; Emerging markets; Securities law; Enforcement; International Development; G15; G18; K22; K42. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51184 Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm: An International History of Private Limited Companies AgEcon Guinnane, Timothy W.; Harris, Ron; Lamoreaux, Naomi R.; Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. We use the history of private limited liability companies (PLLCs) to challenge two pervasive assumptions in the literature: (1) Anglo-American legal institutions were better for economic development than continental Europe’s civil-law institutions; and (2) the corporation was the superior form of business organization. Data on the number and types of firms organized in France, Germany, the UK, and the US show that that the PLLC became the form of choice for small- and medium-size enterprises wherever and whenever it was introduced. The PLLC’s key advantage was its flexible internal governance rules that allowed its users to limit the threat of untimely dissolution inherent in partnerships without taking on the full danger of minority oppression that the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Limited company; Partnership; Corporation; Legal regime; Common law; Civil law; Financial Economics; N8; G3; O16; K22. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6879 Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? AgEcon Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, Alexander. We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the board’s performance expectations and ‘soft’ information about board and CEO actions and the board’s beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board’s expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corporate Governance; Large Shareholders; Boards of Directors; CEO Turnover; Legal Reforms; Transition Economies; Private Equity; Financial Economics; G34; G24; G32; K22; O16; P21. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60665 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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