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| Registros recuperados: 78 | |
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| Huck, Petra; Salhofer, Klaus; Tribl, Christoph. |
| In this paper we develop a theoretical model of competition among marketing cooperatives (co-ops) in a spatial market setting assuming uniform delivered pricing and Loschian conduct. The model is an extension to Alvarez et al.'s (2000) spatial competition model for investorowned firms (IOF). Theoretical results include i) that the prices for raw milk are, ceteris paribus, higher in a pure market of coops than in a pure IOF market; ii) that even coops may imperfectly transmit price changes upstream; and iii) that the price farmers receive for their raw product is a function of economic space (distance times transportation costs) between coops. We test our theoretical findings for milk processing co-ops in Northern Germany using data of monthly average... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Spatial competition; Oligopsony; Milk processing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness; L13; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25633 |
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| Montero, Juan-Pablo. |
| This paper studies firms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission standards, taxes, tradable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic effects, R&D incentives vary widely across market structures and instruments. For example, when firms’ products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when firms’ products are strategic complements, either taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly competitive, however, permits and emission standards offer similar incentives that are lower than those offered by... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Environment; Regulation; Market structure; Innovation; Marketing; Environmental Economics and Policy; L13; L50; Q28. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44294 |
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| Wang, Shinn-Shyr; Rojas, Christian; Lavoie, Nathalie. |
| We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Buyer market power; Vertical differentiation; Wal-Mart; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; Industrial Organization; Marketing; D43; L13; L81; M31; Q13. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57165 |
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| Sorensen, Ann-Christin. |
| The food processing industry in Western countries operates in markets that usually are highly concentrated, consisting of a few cooperatives and investor-owned firms. However, in the literature some studies questioned whether the mixed market structure is a stable equilibrium, and suggestions are made that the cooperatives eventually will crowd out all investor-owned firms. To analyse the problem, the family of models of mixed markets is generalized and analysed. It is shown that a mixed market equilibrium may occur under quite general conditions. Also, it is shown that the investor-owned firm may serve as a yardstick of production to the cooperative, helping farmers achieve an increased payoff relative to a situation with a single coop in the market. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Endogenous membership; Investor-owned-firm; Mixed market; Yardstick of production; Agribusiness; L11; L13; P12; P13; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24741 |
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| Ma, Tay-Cheng. |
| The Taiwanese flour industry’s capacity utilization rate has maintained an extremely low level of 40% for more than 20 years. This article sets up a two-stage game model and uses the strategic effect of the firm’s capital investment on its rivals’ outputs to explain the nature of this excess capacity. The model is tested with panel data from the Taiwanese flour industry by using non-linear three-stage least squares. The evidences indicate that a large capacity built in the past could have been used strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs, in the context of a concerted action among the incumbent firms. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Strategic investment; Two-stage game; Collusion; Conjectural variation; L13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37516 |
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| Registros recuperados: 78 | |
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