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| Registros recuperados: 11 | |
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| Montero, Juan-Pablo. |
| This paper studies firms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission standards, taxes, tradable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic effects, R&D incentives vary widely across market structures and instruments. For example, when firms’ products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when firms’ products are strategic complements, either taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly competitive, however, permits and emission standards offer similar incentives that are lower than those offered by... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Environment; Regulation; Market structure; Innovation; Marketing; Environmental Economics and Policy; L13; L50; Q28. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44294 |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earths fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353 |
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| Slunge, Daniel; Sterner, Thomas. |
| This paper studies the Swedish prohibition of the hazardous solvent Trichloroethylene (TCE). Sweden is alone in completely prohibiting its use. The ban has been at best a partial success and illustrates the dilemmas of policymaking. Use has declined but not stopped, largely because the decision to ban TCE was challenged in the courts. Recently, the EU Court of Justice decided in favor of Sweden's right to have a ban. This article analyzes abatement cost data to show that the cost of replacing TCE is low for most plants, although there appear to be a few firms for which it may be quite high. A cross-country comparison indicates that the Swedish ban was less effective than the very strict technical requirements in Germany or the tax used in Norway. A tax (or... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Hazardous chemicals; Regulation; Environmental tax; Solvents; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; L50; Q28; K32. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10516 |
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| Karp, Larry S.. |
| The use of a constant discount rate to study long-lived environmental problems such as global warming has two disadvantages: the prescribed policy is sensitive to the discount rate, and with moderate discount rates, large future damages have almost no effect on current decisions. Time-consistent quasi-hyperbolic discounting alleviates both of these modeling problems, and is a plausible description of how people think about the future. We analyze the time-consistent Markov Perfect equilibrium in a general model with a stock pollutant. The solution to the linear-quadratic specialization illustrates the role of hyperbolic discounting in a model of global warming. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stock pollutant; Hyperbolic discounting; Global warming; Time consistency; Environmental Economics and Policy; D83; L50. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25069 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Costello, Christopher. |
| We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Quotas; Asymmetric information; Searching; International Relations/Trade; D83; L50. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6245 |
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| Pizer, William A.; Kopp, Raymond J.. |
| Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets have equilibrated. In addition to partial... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Social cost; Cost-benefit; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q20; Q28; H41; L50; D58. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10762 |
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| Koopmann, Georg. |
| In most countries, competition in the telecommunications industry is subject to both sector-specific regulation and more general antitrust policies. At the same time, a process of international market liberalisation is under way in telecommunications which can only be truly effective - and further advance - if appropriate competitive safeguards are in place. Trading partners should agree on certain minimum standards to be observed in this area in order to better combat anticompetitive conduct and avoid international conflicts. The Reference Paper to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is an important step in this direction and may also serve as a model for other network industries. It is a framework of rules which has to be filled with concrete... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regulation; Antitrust; Trade Negotiations; Services; International Relations/Trade; F13; L40; L50; L89. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26230 |
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| Registros recuperados: 11 | |
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