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| Delelegn, Mussie. |
| A significant number of countries - many of which are least-developed countries (LDCs) - are not members of the multilateral trading system (MTS) as yet, and for many the accession process has taken an undesirably long period of time to complete. This lack of participation has important implications for national and global policy making in the field of international trade. However, there is a growing tendency to disregard accession challenges and difficulties facing the weakest members of the international community - the LDCs. The main purposes of this article are to a) discuss the substantive, normative and institutional complexities and requirements surrounding the WTO accession process from the perspective of LDCs, b) assess the possible costs and... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: WTO accession; Challenges; Integration; LDCs; Marginalization; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23890 |
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| Romano, Donato. |
| This paper aims at analyzing the asymmetries in the process of globalization and its differentiated outcomes on (i) developed and less developed countries, and (ii) on LDC agriculture. The consequences of these asymmetries are reflected in the dramatic changes in world agricultural trade an unprecedented growth of agricultural trade in real terms and a dramatic change in its composition which is increasingly moving away from bulk commodities towards high-value, processed consumer-ready agricultural goods. The impacts of these changes on LDC agriculture have been quite differentiated, with most countries experiencing a worsening of their agricultural trade balance. This change of the LDC trade position is counterintuitive if we still think of agricultural... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Globalization; Agriculture; LDCs; International Relations/Trade; O13; Q17. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25253 |
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| Batabyal, Amitrajeet A.. |
| I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal with such firms through their governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the optimal ex post contracts (IEAs), which can be implemented by the SNGA, in turn, in the case where governments and firms in each nation do not collude and then in the case where governments and firms do collude. I find that the monetary transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governments and firms are not very sensitive to the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental; Agreement; LDCs; Budget; Ceiling; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Development; D62; D82; Q25. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28347 |
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