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| Alesina, Alberto; Algan, Yann; Cahuc, Pierre; Giuliano, Paola. |
| Flexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Family Values; Regulation of Labor; Labor Markets; Labor and Human Capital; J; J2; J4. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90908 |
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| Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Multilateral Bargaining; Dynamic Markets; Labor Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; J30; L20. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108255 |
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