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Sorensen, Ann-Christin; Tennbakk, Berit. |
We have employed a simple model to analyse market regulation in a situation with multifunctional agricultural production, i.e., a public good produced jointly with a private good, and where there is imperfect competition in processing. We have analysed the impact on welfare of two archetype regulatory institutions formed to overcome the market imperfections. The institutions, a Regulatory Marketing Board and a Regulatory Marketing Cooperative, are both represented in the Norwegian agricultural market. Taking into account the cost of public funds, we find that the Board in general ensures the highest social welfare. The Cooperative does not replicate the Board solution unless restricted by a price cap and in combination with a production subsidy. If the... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Marketing board; Multifunctionality; Oligopsony; Trade; Political Economy. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24916 |
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Anania, Giovanni. |
The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of the expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. In the first case, the exporting country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening in the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm playing the role of "pure middleman" in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that under all three scenarios, if perfect competition is assumed when market imperfections exist, the... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade liberalization; Imperfect markets; Monopoly; Monopsony; Marketing board; International Relations/Trade. |
Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24971 |
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Anania, Giovanni. |
The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of the expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. In the first case, the exporting country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening in the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm playing the role of "pure middleman" in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that estimates of the impact of a tariff reduction in terms of prices and volume traded obtained assuming... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Trade liberalization; Imperfect markets; Monopoly; Monopsony; Marketing board; International Relations/Trade; F12; F13; Q17; Q18. |
Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28798 |
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