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| Bierbrauer, Felix. |
| The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Public goods; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Contracts; Regulation; Public Economics; D02; D82; H41; L51. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55325 |
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| Johnson, Stanley R.. |
| Policy reforms increasing the roles of markets in agriculture and related institutional changes are occurring worldwide. These are accompanied by and related to rapid technical change, especially for information systems, biotechnology, and organizational mechanisms. Trends in farm size, integration, concentration, environmental sensitivity, organization and funding of research and development, and multinational business organization are among the observable consequences of these changes. With the evolving role of government, new institutions are emerging for shaping the strategic behavior of public and private sector agents. What are the characteristics of these institutions? Where will strategic behavior and interaction of agents have a critical impact on... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural Policy; Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Strategic Behavior; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18512 |
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