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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Hamilton, Stephen F. (2) Innes, Robert (2) Palavra-chave L13 (2) L14 (2) L42 (2) Marketing (2) Monopolization. (2) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Contracting (1) D43 (1) D43. (1) Industrial Organization (1) Slotting fees (1) Vertical contracts (1) Vertical restraints (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Ano 2010 (1) 2006 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Slotting Allowances and Retail Product Variety under Oligopoly AgEcon Innes, Robert; Hamilton, Stephen F.. Slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail market. The role of the practice and its effects on market efficiency are highly controversial. To date, the literature has focused on the effect of the practice on retail prices; however, slotting allowances also have the potential to alter the range of products available to consumers. Our analysis reveals that the strategic use of slotting allowances by oligopoly firms leads to a superior allocation of product variety among retailers. Indeed, absent price effects, we show that slotting allowances lead to the socially optimal provision of product variety. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Slotting fees; Vertical contracts; Monopolization.; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Marketing; L13; L14; L42; D43. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60948 Vertical Restraints and Horizontal Control AgEcon Hamilton, Stephen F.; Innes, Robert. This paper considers vertical restraints in a multi-market retail setting in which each retailer sells the complete line of manufactured goods. Vertical restraints by one manufacturer on the retailers of its product serve as an instrument to exert horizontal control over the retail price of a rival manufactured good. Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand sold at both supermarkets can employ vertical restraints to control the pricing of the retailer’'s competing private labels, and for the personal computer industry, where the manufacturer of an essential computer component can use vertical restraints to control the pricing of complementary components bundled with the essential component by... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracting; Vertical restraints; Monopolization.; Marketing; L13; L14; L42; D43.. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21424 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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