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Nye, John V.C.. |
Britain – contrary to received wisdom – was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis XIV from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad (notably in the form of British merchants, and investors in Portuguese wine) led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports -- notably on wine and spirits -- when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Development; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; F13; H20; N40; N43; N53; O13; Q17. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53881 |
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Oleinik, Anton. |
Modernity is usually thought as a complex society with clearly differentiated spheres of everyday life. It means, in particular, that economic rules do not interfere with the norms structuring political, social, scientific and other interactions. The complex, differentiated society sharply contrasts with a "small" and homogeneous "pre-modern" society. The process of modernization, i.e. differentiation of the spheres of everyday life, can take various forms. In an advanced country it relies on internal forces. Modernization in this context looks like an evolutionary, "bottom-up" development. In a backward country (Russia and Germany in the first half of the 20th century), modernization requires a strong governmental (from the top to the bottom)... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: State bureaucracy; Economic backwardness; Catch-up modernization; Conservative modernization; Opportunism; Institutional constraints; Power; Authority; Invidious comparison; Institutional importation; Democracy; Shared mental model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; A14; B15; B25; B52; D73; H83; K42; N40; O17; P21; P37; P51. |
Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26333 |
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