|
|
|
| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
|
| |
|
|
| Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo. |
| Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical approach in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political instability (conflicts) and emergence of different political systems is presented. The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the possibility that paternalistic or “predatory" autocracies emerge are considered. Under certain circumstances, a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal choice for the oil-rich... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Natural Resources; Rentier States; Conflict and Endogenous Political Regimes; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C72; D74; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123277 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Keohane, Nathaniel O.; Revesz, Richard L.; Stavins, Robert N.. |
| In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the few instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; H11; P16; K32; Q28. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10759 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno. |
| This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Democracy; Income inequality; Property rights; Political Economy; D73; H11; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99685 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Ranis, Gustav. |
| This paper examines the causes of Taiwan's exceptional economic performance, focusing on the influence of organizational and policy choices and how Taiwan's example differs from those of more typical less-developed countries. After briefly citing cultural factors as proposed by his late colleague John Fei, Ranis proceeds to explore the issues of organic nationalism, natural resource endowment, access to foreign capital and other political factors that have produced such economic success. The author demonstrates how Taiwan's unique combination of strong organic nationalism, meager natural resources and limited access to foreign capital helped curb the Extended Dutch Disease phenomenon endemic in LDCs. In addition, the government's nonoscillatory, relatively... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economic development; LDC; Political economy; Taiwan; Extended Dutch disease; Democracy; International Development; Political Economy; O10; O11; O50; P16. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28422 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Panizza, Ugo; Yanez, Monica. |
| This paper uses opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms implemented by most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The paper also explores four possible sets of explanations for this discontent: (i) a general drift of the populace’s political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. The paper’s principal finding is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Reforms; Crisis; Latin America; P16; O54. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37219 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Shams, Rasul. |
| The EAC is on the verge of establishing a customs union. But this is accompanied by fears that the Customs Union would lead to trade imbalances among the Partner States, which would create serious problems for the proper functioning of the Customs Union itself. To mitigate these problems the establishment of a transitional fund is proposed. Based on a study of the trade effects of the Customs Union it is shown that these fears are unfounded, and the establishment of a transitional fund to address imbalances therefore not necessary. Stakeholders views on the establishment of a transitional fund are also analysed to assess their influence on the integration policy in the EAC. The historical background of the fears of a customs union is described and it is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economic Integration; Africa; Political Economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; F15; O55; P16. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26261 |
| |
|
|
| Gennaioli, Caterina; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector. Taking a political economy approach, we analyze the link between public support schemes for renewable energy and the potential scope for rent seeking and corruption. The insights of a model of political influence by interest groups are tested empirically using a panel data of Italian provinces for the period 1990-2007. We find evidence that a curse exists in the case of wind energy, and specifically that: i) criminal association activity increased more in high-wind provinces and especially after the introduction of a more favourable public policy regime and, ii) the expansion of the wind energy sector has been driven by both the wind level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Natural Resources Curse; Wind Energy; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D73; O13; P16. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115846 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
| Registros recuperados: 20 | |
|
|
|
