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| Kronenberg, Jakub; Department of International Economics, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz; kronenbe@uni.lodz.pl; Hubacek, Klaus; Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Maryland, College Park; Hubacek@umd.edu. |
| Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have received much praise and are increasingly perceived as a promising tool to ensure the protection of global ecosystems as well as being able to help alleviate poverty in areas rich in ecosystem services. Given current trends, the scale of payments is likely to grow, creating new circumstances within which ecosystem services will be managed. In this dynamic context, following a precautionary approach, one should focus on establishing systems to handle the risks involved. Based on an analogy to resources that have long been included in the system of market transactions, we suggest that the rapid development of PES can negatively influence regional and potentially national economies. Resource revenues are highly... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed article |
Palavras-chave: Aid curse; Ecosystem services; Global PES; Payments for ecosystem services; PES; Resource curse. |
| Ano: 2013 |
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| Meijerink, Gerdien W.. |
| The idea of Payments for environmental services (PES) has an appealing simplicity, which may explain the success of the concept. However, successful projects are far limited though and two constraints have been identified in literature. The first is limited demand: too few service users are so confident about the mechanism that they are willing to pay. The second obstacle is poor knowledge on the institutional requirements entailing incentive and livelihood mechanisms which so far have received comparatively less attention. This paper focuses on both constraints by arguing that monitoring effectiveness and conditionality of PES schemes are crucial and that institutional arrangements for monitoring should be in place. By analysing in a systematic way what... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: PES; Monitoring; Measurement; Institutional arrangement; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7948 |
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