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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Karp, Larry S. (3) Hong, Fuhsai (1) Simon, Leo K. (1) Zhao, Jinhua (1) Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) International Environmental Agreement (3) Participation game (3) C72 (2) Climate agreement (2) H4 (2) Q54 (2) Cost uncertainty (1) Emissions trade (1) Escape clause (1) Investment (1) Investment spillovers (1) Kyoto Protocol (1) Mixed strategy (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Stable coalitions (1) Trans-boundary pollution (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working Paper (2) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2012 (2) 2009 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Participation games and international environmental agreements: a nonparametric model AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Simon, Leo K.. We examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements, cartel formation, R&D spillovers, and monetary policy. The literature to date has relied on parametric examples; based on these examples, a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game, the equilibrium coalition size is small, except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small. In this paper, we develop a non-parametric approach to the problem, and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust. In a general setting, we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large. Contrary to previously examined leading special cases, we... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Participation game; International Environmental Agreement; Climate agreement; Trans-boundary pollution; Investment spillovers; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123717 International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment AgEcon Hong, Fuhsai; Karp, Larry S.. We modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreement; Climate agreement; Participation game; Investment; Mixed strategy; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H4; Q54. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123719 International Environmental Agreements: Emissions trade, safety valves and escape clauses AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua. We explain how the structure of multi-national or multi-regional environmental agreements affect their chance of success. Trade in emissions permits has ambiguous and in some cases surprising effects on both the equilibrium level of abatement, and on the ability to persuade nations or regions to participate in environmental agreements. An escape clause policy and a safety valve policy have essentially the same properties when membership in environmental agreement is pre-determined, but they create markedly different effects on the incentives to join such an agreement. The two policies lead to a qualitative difference in the leverage that a potential member of the agreement exercises on other members. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Kyoto Protocol; Escape clause; Emissions trade; Cost uncertainty; Participation game; International Environmental Agreement; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; H4; Q54. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51611 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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