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| Yano, Yuki; Blandford, David. |
| Achieving high compliance rates in incentive-based agri-environmental schemes is an important issue. This paper explores the use of a mixed penalty-reward approach under heterogeneous compliance costs. Specifically, we examine the use of a “compliance reward” under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. Using a budget-neutral approach, three possible sources of financing are considered: 1. funds obtained by reducing monitoring effort; 2. the proceeds of fines collected from participating farmers who are inspected and found not to be in compliance; and 3. money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyze them numerically for both risk-neutral and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental policy; Moral hazard; Penalties; Payments for compliance; Q12; Q20; Q28; Q57. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36873 |
