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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Stranlund, John K. (3) Murphy, James J. (2) Spraggon, John M. (2) Zhang, Wei (1) Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) L51 (3) Permit markets (3) Q58 (3) C91 (2) Compliance (2) Emissions trading (2) Enforcement (2) Laboratory experiments (2) Public Economics (2) Bankruptcy (1) Permit banking (1) Pollution (1) Q28 (1) Tradable permits (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2010 (1) 2008 (1) 2007 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.. Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions trading; Laboratory experiments; Permit markets; Permit banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93966 Bankruptcy Risk and the Performance of Tradable Permit Markets AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Zhang, Wei. We study the impact of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if they were financially secure. Consequently, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable property rights causes an inefficient distribution of individual choices among regulated firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is not independent of the initial distribution of permits. In fact, the inefficiency that is associated with bankruptcy risk is mitigated if financially insecure firms are given a larger share of the initial allocation of permits. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Tradable permits; Permit markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q28; Q58. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7384 Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.. This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low. Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Compliance; Emissions trading; Permit markets; Pollution; Laboratory experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42124 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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