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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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Alston, Julian M.; Carter, Colin A.; Wohlgenant, Michael K.. |
Political-economic analyses of the causes and consequences of agricultural commodity policies typically emphasize farmer and consumer (taxpayer) interests and underplay the role of agribusiness. A more complete understanding of agricultural policy requires paying attention to the important role of agribusiness interests. Policies that benefit farmers (e.g., price supports, supply controls, deficiency payments) may either enhance or reduce agribusiness profits. The type of policy instrument preferred by agribusiness varies among commodities, depending on the technology of the marketing processes beyond the farm gate and the elasticity of final demand. This paper emphasizes the idea that instruments of farm policy are chosen in response to pressures from... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Farm programs; Farm policy; Agribusiness; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy. |
Ano: 1989 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51252 |
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Skees, Jerry R.. |
This article challenges the traditional model of the economist as a humble technocrat who simply provides analysis given the preferences of policy decision-makers. Since decision-makers rarely reveal their preferences, it is important that the would-be policy research/analyst know the political economy and be willing to identify potential performance goals for society. Researchers who are willing to incur the transaction cost associated with becoming involved in useful policy research must learn to work within the imperfect policy process. Policy research that considers the importance of implementation and that acknowledges the institutions and the history will have the highest chance of being useful to policy-makers. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Implementation; Institutions; Policy research; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy. |
Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15440 |
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Galan, Juan Sebastian. |
This paper uses historic data from Cundinamarca, Colombia to empirically assess the impact of land inequality persistence, inherited from the colonial rule, on economic development in the long run. Based on the Engerman & Sokoloff hypothesis and the use of GIS, I use plausible exogenous variation in land endowments to design an instrumental variable strategy. In contrast to recent studies, I find that more unequal municipalities in the XIX and XX century are associated with better growth, human capital and public goods provision measures today. Political economy channels instead of agricultural productivity gains can explain these results. In municipalities where land was historically more concentrated, powerful landowners were more successful in... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Land inequality; Growth; Public goods; Political economy; Land Economics/Use; O13; D31; N36. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107398 |
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Boyd, James; Brennan, Timothy J.. |
The paper evaluates the desirability of compensation for regulatory takings. To do so, we describe a public choice model in which regulators' decisions are influenced by competing political interests. We consider how the political incentives of landowners, environmentalists, and taxpayers are affected by alternative compensation rules and in turn describe the regulatory decisions made in such a pluralistic political environment. Modeling the regulator's incentives in this way leads to the conclusion that compensation should not be paid unless environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence politically. Moreover, the model has several counter-intuitive implications when political influence is not balanced. For instance, if environmentalists are... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Compensation; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; D72; L51. |
Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10702 |
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Durand-Morat, Alvaro; Wailes, Eric J.; Sharp, Misti. |
The fact that trade, and especially agricultural trade, remains far from free is puzzling, since the superiority of free trade receives overwhelming support among economists (Gawande and Krishna, 2003; Rodrik, 1994). International trade scholars have devoted significant resources to forecasting the impact of trade policy reforms (for a survey of these studies see Congressional Budget Office, 2005), and their findings are relevant inputs for officials negotiating a trade agreement as well as for politicians in charge of ratifying it. The perceived gains and losses attached to different outcomes have been identified as a significant factor shifting the outcome of a trade agreement negotiation (McMillan, 1990). Less well-known are the factors that would... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade negotiations; Agricultural trade; Free trade agreements; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; F59; Q17. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103835 |
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Ranjan, Ram. |
This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642 |
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Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903 |
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Ando, Amy Whritenour; Palmer, Karen L.. |
Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94. |
Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643 |
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Pezzey, John C.V.; Jotzo, Frank. |
We give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission control, using the first multiparty model to combine tax-versus-trading under uncertainties with revenue recycling. Including multiple parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions (permit) trading in handling abatement-cost uncertainties, from that shown by existing, single-party literature. But a tax has a different, much bigger advantage, from better handling uncertainties in business-as-usual emissions. Either mechanism's free emissions share, from tax thresholds or free permits, which lowers its possible welfare gain from revenue recycling, may however dominate any tax-versus-trading advantage. Moreover, political and practical constraints, such as... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Emission pricing; Tax vs. trading; Uncertainties; Revenue recycling; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; D810; H230; Q580. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95049 |
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Nuppenau, Ernst-August. |
We will analyze a newly emerging conflict within the second pillar of the rural development policy of the EU: a conflict between those farmers, who want to participate in high nature value agriculture, and farmers, who feel negatively impacted by supporting nature provision. We see a link through competition for land between nature provision in agriculture and cost minimal production of commercial farmers. The idea is to model this conflict using a political bargain approach and make a contribution on how to solve the conflict by innovative institutional arrangements. The power of groups will be analyzed and what governments can do. |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Conflict; Political economy; Nature provision; Community/Rural/Urban Development. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95313 |
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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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