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TRANSPARENCY AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COMPETITION AgEcon
Wilson, William W.; Johnson, D. Demcey; Dahl, Bruce L..
Export subsidies and price transparency will be areas of critical importance in the forthcoming round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. This paper provides a review and discussion of issues relating to export subsidies and transparency in international wheat trade. Among other topics, the paper addresses the escalation in U.S. and EU producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for wheat since 1996, EU export restitutions, export credit guarantee programs, and price transparency and price discrimination, specifically as they relate to State Trading Enterprises (STEs). As the United States develops its strategy for trade negotiations, several points should be considered. First, the European Union continues to subsidize its wheat much more...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: WTO; Policy; Wheat; Price Transparency; Price Discrimination; Export Subsidies; STEs; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23208
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TRANSPARENCY AND BIDDING COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL WHEAT TRADE AgEcon
Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.; Johnson, D. Demcey.
One of the major trade policy problems identified by U.S. interests, including grower groups, traders, and policymakers, is that of pricing transparency. This has been a gnawing issue generally related to the pricing practices of competitor exporting countries with state trading enterprises (STEs). The transparency problem generally refers to the inability to observe rivals' terms of trade (including price, quality, credit, etc.) and is normally associated with commercial exporters competing against STE rivals. The perception being the less transparent competitors (STEs) would have a strategic advantage. A game theory model of bidding competition was developed to simulate the effects of information asymmetry amongst rivals. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Price Transparency; Strategic Bidding; Game Theory; Bayesian-Nash; State Trading Enterprises; Export Enhancement Program; Wheat; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23403
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