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| Resende Filho, Moises de Andrade. |
| The principal-agent model can be more often employed as a conceptual framework for studies in the fields of economics and finance. This article presents real examples in which this theoretical model fits well. It is admitted that the complexity of this type of model can be a barrier to its use. Therefore, it is presented a typical principal-agent model that is simple enough to make it possible to find an analytical solution to the problem. It is shown, relying on the model’s closed-form solution, that moral hazard, in general, lowers efforts by the agent and expected profit for the principal. In fact, it is argued that the consequences of moral hazard would be even worst if no incentive mechanism were in place. Furthermore, it is shown that the greater are... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Incentive mechanisms; Theory of firm; Theory of organizations; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53873 |
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| Abougamos, Hoda; White, Benedict; Sadler, Rohan. |
| The export of grain from Western Australia depends upon a grain supply network that takes grain from farm to port through Cooperative Bulk Handling receival and storage sites. The ability of the network to deliver pest free grain to the port and onto ship depends upon the quality of grain delivered by farmers and the efficacy of phosphine based fumigation in controlling stored grain pests. Phosphine fumigation is critical to the grain supply network because it is the cheapest effective fumigant. In addition, it is also residue free. Unfortunately, over time, common stored-grain pests have evolved to develop resistance to phosphine and there is a risk that phosphine will become less effective and may need to be replaced with more expensive alternative... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Principal-agent model; Supply contracts; Moral hazard; Stored grain; Biosecurity; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124216 |
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| Souza Monteiro, Diogo M.; Caswell, Julie A.. |
| Traceability systems are information tools implemented within and between firms in food chains to improve logistics and transparency or to reduce total food safety damage costs. Information about location and condition of products is critical when food safety incidents arise. This paper uses a principal-agent model to investigate the optimal choice of voluntary traceability in terms of precision of information on a given attribute at each link of a food chain. The results suggest that four scenarios may emerge for the supply chain depending on the costs of a system and whether or not the industry can internalize total food safety damages: no traceability, traceability for one link, equal traceability for all links, or different positive traceability levels... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Traceability; Food safety; Principal-agent model; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44394 |
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