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Tisdell, Clement A.. |
Some wildlife species are agricultural pests (or otherwise a problem) but their populations are often valued by other than agriculturalists or by those not adversely affected by them directly. For non-farmers, the population levels of such wildlife are frequently pure public goods. This is one source of market failure in the economically optimal social control of an (agricultural) pest of this type. Secondly, if the species is geographically mobile, externalities occur between farmers (or other individuals) in the control of the species, and individuals ignore these spillovers in controlling pest species. Simple analysis is used to show that depending on the relative strength of these opposing types of market failure, farmers (or others) may excessively... |
Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agriculture; Market failure; Pest control; Pure public goods; West Bengal; Wildlife; Zoonoses.; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122727 |
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Yamaguchi, Chikara. |
This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a federation where regional governments provide a pure public good non-cooperatively and policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving. A high degree of household mobility across regions forces the governments to raise the efficiency of the public good, however, it also helps to waste resources. It is shown that regional Leviathans not only under-provide the public good but also decrease the amount of wasteful expenditures as households become less mobile. Central government’s intervention can enhance efficiency if households are attached to particular regions. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Pure public goods; Leviathan; Household mobility; H70; H77. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43632 |
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