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| Guyader, Olivier. |
| With a thin economic component, most bio-economic models of fisheries fail to assess the effects of the regulation systems on firms. In order to analyse the short term consequences of different management schemes, a simulation model is applied to the French driftnet albacore fleet: licence allocation with driftnet regulation, individual quotas, and individual transferable quotas without any input control. Vessel technology is estimated by using the data collected, and groups of vessels are distinguished according to criteria of performance. We present the adjustment within firms and between groups under different scenarios (limited entry with and without driftnet regulation, individual quotas and individual transferable quotas allocation), and we compare... |
| Tipo: Text |
Palavras-chave: Albacore tuna; Dolphin; Driftnet; Fisheries; ITQ; Licence; Quasi-rent; Quota price; Quotas; Regulation; Simulation. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00244/35523/34036.pdf |
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| Fulginiti, Lilyan E.; Perrin, Richard K.. |
| This paper adapts a partial equilibrium approach of Allais and Diewert to measure the efficiency loss in the producing sector due to quotas. The measure of waste is the additional profits available for reallocation subject to constraints that the welfare of persons and firms outside the sector is unaffected. It is relevant to a sector which faces fixed prices for some commodities, but endogenous prices for others. Tobacco quotas in the United State are estimated to have caused quota-induced producer-sector waste of approximately $95 million per year during 1950-82, or about 3 percent of the average value of the crop. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Waste; Deadweight loss; Production sector; Quotas; Production Economics. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18566 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Costello, Christopher. |
| We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Quotas; Asymmetric information; Searching; International Relations/Trade; D83; L50. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6245 |
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