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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Kinateder, Markus (2) Palavra-chave C72 (2) C73 (2) D85 (2) Network (2) Repeated Game (2) Centrality (1) Communication (1) Delayed Perfect Monitoring (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Imperfect Private Monitoring (1) Prisoner’s Dilemma (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Strategic Communication (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2010 (1) 2008 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Repeated Games Played in a Network AgEcon Kinateder, Markus. Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely,... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C73; D85. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6377 The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network AgEcon Kinateder, Markus. Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Network; Strategic Communication; Centrality; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C73; D85. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96669 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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