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Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K..
Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382
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The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence AgEcon
McEvoy, David M.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.; Stranlund, John K..
This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stable coalitions; Self-enforcing agreements; Compliance; Enforcement; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; H41; C92.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42126
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