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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Barrett, Christopher B. (1) Coppock, D. Layne (1) Desta, Solomon (1) Guinnane, Timothy W. (1) Lybbert, Travis J. (1) Streb, Jochen (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Social insurance (2) Common property (1) Covariate risk (1) Ethiopia (1) H53 (1) H55 (1) Health Economics and Policy (1) I18 (1) Idiosyncratic risk (1) Knappschaft (1) Moral hazard (1) N33 (1) N43 (1) O1 (1) Political Economy (1) Poverty traps (1) Public Economics (1) Q12 (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Sickness insurance (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2009 (1) 2002 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última STOCHASTIC WEALTH DYNAMICS AND RISK MANAGEMENT AMONG A POOR POPULATION AgEcon Lybbert, Travis J.; Barrett, Christopher B.; Desta, Solomon; Coppock, D. Layne. The literature on economic growth and development has focused considerable attention on questions of risk management and the possibility of multiple equilibria associated with poverty traps. We use herd history data collected among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia to study stochastic wealth dynamics among a very poor population. These data yield several novel findings. Although covariate rainfall shocks plainly matter, household-specific factors, including own herd size, account for most observed variability in wealth dynamics. Despite longstanding conventional wisdom about common property grazing lands, we find no statistical support for the tragedy of the commons hypothesis. It appears that past studies may have conflated costly self-insurance with... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common property; Covariate risk; Ethiopia; Idiosyncratic risk; Poverty traps; Social insurance; Risk and Uncertainty; O1; Q12. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14736 Moral Hazard in a Mutual Health-Insurance System: German Knappschaften, 1867-1914 AgEcon Guinnane, Timothy W.; Streb, Jochen. This paper studies moral hazard in a sickness-insurance fund that provided the model for social-insurance schemes around the world. The German Knappschaften were formed in the medieval period to provide sickness, accident, and death benefits for miners. By the mid-nineteenth century, participation in the Knappschaft was compulsory for workers in mines and related occupations, and the range and generosity of benefits had expanded considerably. Each Knappschaft was locally controlled and self-funded, and their admirers saw in them the ability to use local knowledge and good incentives to deliver benefits at low cost. The Knappschaft underlies Bismarck’s sickness and accident insurance legislation (1883 and 1884), which in turn forms the basis of the German... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Sickness insurance; Moral hazard; Knappschaft; Social insurance; Health Economics and Policy; Political Economy; Public Economics; N33; N43; H55; H53; I18. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54533 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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