SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the “capped strict liability scheme”. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities...

The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A « Trompe l'œil » Perspective

Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101299

Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety

Gerard, Mondello.

This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up liability regime on their capacity to provide the highest level of safety is ineffective. This demonstration lies on two components. The first one gathers some results drawn from literature that introduces uncertainty. The second one takes into consideration the beliefs of agents and their aversion to ambiguity. The model applies uncertainty to the level of maximum damage. This demonstration reinforces the previous result. Hence, both regimes apply on specific tort question and comparing...

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Negligence Rule; Ambiguity Theory; Uncertainty; Accident Model; Risk and Uncertainty; K0; K32; Q01; Q58.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121910

This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because...

Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better?

Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94736

Ultra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are...

Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety

Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Electric Energy; Nuclear Plants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q5; Q58; Q53; K23; L13; L52; L94.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102571