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Intel's XL Permit: A Framework for Evaluation AgEcon
Boyd, James; Krupnick, Alan J.; Mazurek, Janice V..
The paper develops a framework to evaluate permits granted to firms under the Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL -- with emphasis on the novel air permit granted to the Intel Corporation. We describe the permit, the process that created it, and the types of costs and benefits likely to arise from this type of "facility-specific" regulatory arrangement. Among other things, the paper describes the permit's impact on environmental quality, production costs, transaction costs, and Intel's strategic market position. The paper also considers how an estimate of the costs and benefits -- both to Intel and society -- might be estimated. While facility-specific regulation typically conjures images of production cost savings as processes are re-engineered...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Project XL; Tailored regulation; Environmental regulation; Cost-benefit analysis; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; L51; Q28; L63; K32.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10666
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The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental Regulations: Evidence from EPA's Project XL AgEcon
Blackman, Allen; Mazurek, Janice V..
The flagship of the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory reinvention initiative, Project XL has been touted as a "regulatory blueprint" for a site-specific, performance-based pollution control system. But widespread complaints about the costs of the program beg the question of whether the costs of tailoring regulations to individual facilities are manageable. To address this question, this paper presents original survey data on a sample of 11 XL projects. We find that the fixed costs of putting in place XL agreements are substantial, averaging over $450,000 per firm. While stakeholder negotiations are widely cited as the principal source for these costs, we find that they actually arise mainly from interaction between participating facilities and...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Project XL; Site-specific regulation; Tailored regulation; Voluntary regulation; Transactions costs; Regulatory reform and reinvention; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10844
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Regulatory Tailoring, Reliability, and Price Volatility with Stochastic Breakdowns AgEcon
Gruenspecht, Howard K..
Although real-world energy supply systems are subject to stochastic failures, the impacts of proposed regulations affecting these systems have typically been evaluated using non-stochastic models. This paper develops an energy market model that explicitly allows for stochastic failures and demonstrates they play an important, or even dominant, role in determining the market impacts of environmental regulations that tailor product specifications to address local or regional conditions, such as fuel-formulation requirements specific to certain regional markets within the United States. While traditional non-stochastic analyses view the tailoring of regulatory requirements by location as an efficiency-enhancing alternative to a -one size fits all- regulatory...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Reliability; Boutique fuels; Gasoline price spikes; Stochastic failures; Environmental regulation; Tailored regulation; Demand and Price Analysis; Q2; Q4.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10781
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Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare? AgEcon
Blackman, Allen; Boyd, James.
Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants' costs of complying with environmental regulations. But in doing so, it can also provide participants with a competitive advantage. We show that this can have undesirable welfare consequences when it enables relatively inefficient firms in oligopolistic markets to "steal" market share from more efficient firms. One critical determinant of whether or not TR has such adverse welfare impacts is the regulator's policy regarding the diffusion of TR agreements among...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tailored regulation; Voluntary; Site-specific; Performance standards; Regulatory reform; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10740
Registros recuperados: 4
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