Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 5
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
ECONOMICS OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ADMINISTRATION AgEcon
Skully, David W..
The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was a step toward free trade. The Agreement lifts bans and quotas on imports, but allows their conversion into tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which function like quotas. At present, many of the 1,300 TRQs increased market access to imports, but some have preserved pre-Agreement levels of protection. The World Trade Organization's intent as to the administration of TRQs is open to interpretation. This report analyzes seven administrative methods in light of the principle of nondiscrimination. We conclude that auctions are the best way to administer a TRQ. First-come, first-served and license-on-demand methods present a moderate risk of biased trade. State trading organizations and producer groups that directly...
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Tariff-rate quotas; Quantitative restrictions; Trade barriers; Tariffs; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/33576
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
PROFILES OF TARIFFS IN GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AgEcon
Gibson, Paul R.; Wainio, John; Whitley, Daniel B.; Bohman, Mary.
High protection for agricultural commodities in the form of tariffs continues to be the major factor restricting world trade. The large differences in average tariffs across countries make it possible for farmers in one country to benefit from tariff protection while farmers in other countries lose income because of lower prices resulting from those tariffs. This report provides the first comprehensive analysis of agricultural tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (limits on imported goods) across a large number of countries and commodities and finds that high average tariffs create barriers to markets for U.S. and other farmers.
Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Market access; Megatariffs; Tariff profiles; Over-quota tariffs; In-quota tariffs; Tariff-rate quotas; World Trade Organization; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/34055
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
The Art of Exceptions: Sensitive Products in the Doha Negotiations AgEcon
Gouel, Christophe; Mitaritonna, Cristina; Ramos, Maria Priscila.
It is necessary for multilateral trade negotiations to include exceptions to accommodate politically sensitive sectors. However, given the highly concentrated distribution of agricultural protection, too many exceptions put at risk the objectives of World Trade Organization. This paper assesses the delicate balance required, based on the case of agricultural trade protection in Europe and Japan, two countries where tariff dismantling in the agricultural sector is a particularly sensitive issue. Since agricultural border protection is heterogeneous, we avoid aggregation bias by extending a multi-country computable general equilibrium model to the product level. This allows us to combine the assets from general equilibrium and partial equilibrium modeling,...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural trade; Doha Development Agenda; CGE model; Disaggregation; Sensitive products; Tariff-rate quotas; Agricultural and Food Policy; C68; F13; F17; Q17; Q18.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115431
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Institutionalized Metzler Effects: Tariff-Rate Quota Liberalization in a Supply-Managed Industry AgEcon
Pouliot, Sebastien; Larue, Bruno.
A supply management system governs Canada’s poultry sector. Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs), with prohibitive above-quota tariffs and low in-quota tariff, mimic import-quotas limit international competition in Canada’s poultry market. The quota part of the TRQs is a minimum access commitment under international trade agreement that is defined as a fraction of domestic production. We show in a 3-stage game involving negotiations between retailers and processors and between processors and farms that increasing minimum access commitment under current trade agreements can produce Metzler effects with larger price increases observed at the farm and processing levels. Simulations based on 2008 data support the Metzler paradox and shed light on import license...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Metzler paradox; Tariff-rate quotas; Chicken; Negotiations; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade; F13; Q17.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102651
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
OPENING GLOBAL MARKETS FOR AGRICULTURE: THE NEXT WTO ROUND AgEcon
Sumner, Daniel A..
More open international markets benefit the economy as a whole, as well as most U.S. agricultural producers. The Uruguay Round Agreement laid out a useful framework. Specifically addressed here is why the key to further liberalizing agricultural trade is reduction of tariffs as comprehensively and rapidly as politics will allow. Other issues such as export subsidies, tariff-rate quota quantities, and developing-country relationships are also important, especially while tariffs are coming down. Internal support rules have much less potential to liberalize trade. Finally, as the December 1999 World Trade Organization ministerial meeting in Seattle demonstrated, delay in the negotiation process threatens liberalization.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agricultural policy; Agricultural trade; Commodity trade; Tariff-rate quotas; Tariffs; Trade negotiations; WTO; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14709
Registros recuperados: 5
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional