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| Krakowski, Michael. |
| This paper analyses the determinants of the size of the informal economy using cross-country regressions. Two sets of global data using indirect estimation techniques and the perception of business leaders for 109 countries as well as a regional set for Latin America based on direct data are used to estimate the size of the informal economies. Indirect estimation techniques arrive at higher estimates of the size of the informal economy than the perceptions of business leaders because they include not only the (fundamentally legal) activities of the informal sector, but also those activities which are illegal per se. Both kinds of estimate show strong regional differences in the size of the informal economies. Regressions on a set of indicators covering the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Informal sector; Tax evasion; Business regulation; Political Economy; O17; H26. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26313 |
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| Gandelman, Nestor. |
| In a multi community environment local authorities compete for tax base. When monitoring is imperfect, agents may decide not to pay in their community (evasion), and save the tax difference. The agent decision on where to pay taxes is based on the probability of getting caught, the fine he eventually will have to pay and the time cost of paying in a neighbor community. First, we prove that if the focus of the agents’ decision is the probability of getting caught and the fine, only the richest people evade. If instead, the key ingredient is the time cost of evading, only the poorest cheat. Second, we test the evasion pattern on the Automobile Registration System in Uruguay using two stochastic dominance tests. The evidence favors in this case the hypothesis... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Tax evasion; Stochastic dominance; H26; H77; C52. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37120 |
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