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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor De Cian, Enrica (2) Bosetti, Valentina (1) Dellink, Rob B. (1) Nagashima, Miyuki (1) Palavra-chave Technology Spillovers (3) C72 (2) Environmental Economics and Policy (2) Q54 (2) Q55 (2) C3 (1) Climate Change (1) Climate Change Modelling (1) Factor-Augmenting Technical Change (1) International Environmental Agreements (1) Non-cooperative Game Theory (1) O33 (1) O47 (1) Panel Data (1) Partial Cooperation (1) Q56 (1) Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Working Paper (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (1) 2007 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action AgEcon Bosetti, Valentina; De Cian, Enrica. In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to adopt cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD countries to undertake a moderate, but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission reductions are moderate, OECD countries find it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Technology Spillovers; Climate Change; Partial Cooperation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q55; C72. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119104 Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions AgEcon Nagashima, Miyuki; Dellink, Rob B.. Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Climate Change Modelling; International Environmental Agreements; Non-cooperative Game Theory; Technology Spillovers; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; O33; Q54. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7442 Factor-Augmenting Technical Change: An Empirical Assessment AgEcon De Cian, Enrica. Starting from a system of factor demands, an empirical model that allows estimating factor-augmenting technical change is derived. Factor-augmenting technical change is defined as the improvement in factor productivities that can occur either exogenously or endogenously, with changes in other macroeconomic variables. This paper provides additional estimates for the substitution possibilities among inputs and it offers new empirical evidence on the direction and sources of factor-augmenting technical change, an issue that has not yet been explored by the empirical literature on growth determinants. The empirical findings suggest that technical change is directed. Technical change tends to be more energy-saving than capital- and labour-saving. Both R&D... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Factor-Augmenting Technical Change; Technology Spillovers; Panel Data; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; C3; O47; Q55; Q56. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50403 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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