|
|
| Dharmapala, Dhammika; Hoffmann, Sandra A.; Schwartz, Warren. |
| The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, misperception, or error) all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both injurers and victims. This paper generalizes the standard model to consider situations in which one party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's effort or cost of taking precaution. If the injurer's care affects the victim's precaution costs (but not vice versa), most of the standard results continue to hold (except for strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence). If the victims precaution affects the injurers costs of care (but not vice versa), only strict liability with a defense of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Law and economics; Tort laws; Risk and Uncertainty; K13; K00. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10626 |
| |
