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Slotting Allowances and Retail Product Variety under Oligopoly AgEcon
Innes, Robert; Hamilton, Stephen F..
Slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail market. The role of the practice and its effects on market efficiency are highly controversial. To date, the literature has focused on the effect of the practice on retail prices; however, slotting allowances also have the potential to alter the range of products available to consumers. Our analysis reveals that the strategic use of slotting allowances by oligopoly firms leads to a superior allocation of product variety among retailers. Indeed, absent price effects, we show that slotting allowances lead to the socially optimal provision of product variety.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Slotting fees; Vertical contracts; Monopolization.; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Marketing; L13; L14; L42; D43.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60948
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Consumer, Manufacturer and Retailer Responses to Health Price Policies: the example of EU Sugar Price Reform on the Soft Drink Market AgEcon
Bonnet, Céline; Requillart, Vincent.
Healthier food diet is likely to prevent numerous non communicable diseases. Then there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact of food price taxation on food consumption. However, strategic reactions of both manufacturers and retailers are missing in empirical analyses. Rather, passive pricing is assumed. Ignoring strategic pricing might lead to under-estimate or over-estimate the impact of food taxation. Based on the example of the soft drink industry, we analyse the bias which is introduced when assuming passive pricing. Using structural econometric model, we first estimate models of vertical relationships between the beverage industry and the retail industry. After selecting the ’best’ model of vertical relationships, we then simulate different...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Vertical contracts; Two part tariffs; Competition; Manufacturers; Private labels; Retailers; Differentiated products; Soft drinks; Non nested tests; Sugar CMO; Passthrough; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Health Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108788
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Arm's-Length Transactions as a Source of Incomplete Cross-Border Transmission: the Case of Autos AgEcon
Hellerstein, Rebecca; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
A growing share of international trade occurs through intra-firm transactions, transactions between domestic and foreign subsidiaries of a multinational firm. The difficulties associated with writing and enforcing a vertical contract compound when a product must cross a national border, and may explain the high rate of multinational trade across such borders. We show that this common crossborder organization of the firm may have implications for the well-documented incomplete transmission of shocks across such borders. We present new evidence of a positive relationship between an industry's share of multinational trade and its rate of exchange-rate pass-through to prices. We then develop a structural econometric model with both manufacturers and retailers...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cross-border transmission: Multinationals; Arm's-length transactions; Real exchange rates; Exchange-rate pass-through; Vertical contracts; Autos; International Relations/Trade; F14; F3; F4.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7196
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Vertical relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data AgEcon
Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
In this paper different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared. Demand estimates are used to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed. The purpose is to identify which set of margins is compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost, and to select the model most consistent with the data among non-nested competing models. The models considered are: (1) a simple linear pricing model; (2) a vertically integrated model; and (3) a variety of alternative (strategic) supply scenarios that allow for collusion, non-linear pricing and strategic behavior with respect to private label products. Using...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Vertical contracts; Multiple manufacturers and retailers; Non-nested tests; Yogurt local market.; Industrial Organization; L13; L81; C12; C33.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25015
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IS THE EU SUGAR POLICY REFORM LIKELY TO INCREASE OBESITY? AgEcon
Bonnet, Céline; Requillart, Vincent.
National Health authorities recommend a decrease in the consumption of ’added’ sugar. At the same moment, a reform of the Common Organisation of the Sugar Market will lead to a decrease by more than 30% of the sugar price in the EU. Using the example of the soft drink industry, this paper investigates the impact of that reform on the consumption of sugar sweetened beverages. Because the soft drink industry as well as the retail industry are both highly concentrated, using structural econometrics model, we first estimate models of vertical relationships between the beverage industry and the retail industry. After selecting the ’best’ model of vertical relationships, we then simulate the impact of the decrease in sugar price on prices and consumption for...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Vertical contracts; Two part tariffs; Competition; Manufacturers; Private labels; Retailers; Differentiated products; Soft drinks; Non nested tests; Sugar CMO; Passthrough; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116414
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Two-Part Tariffs versus Linear Pricing Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Tests on Differentiated Products Markets AgEcon
Bonnet, Céline; Dubois, Pierre; Simioni, Michel.
We present a methodology allowing to introduce manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market. We consider in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part tariffs contracts and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed in two part tariffs contracts. Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models and two part tariffs. The methodology allows then to test between different hypothesis on the contracting and pricing relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry using exogenous variables supposed to shift the...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Vertical contracts; Two part tariffs; Double marginalization; Collusion; Competition; Manufacturers; Retailers; Differentiated products; Water; Non nested tests; Industrial Organization; L13; L81; C12; C33.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25685
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Outsourcing and pass-through AgEcon
Hellerstein, Rebecca; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
Revised October 2008 Revised on December, 2009 Revised on February 26, 2010
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Exchange-rate pass-through; Intra-firm trade; Vertical contracts; Outsourcing; Financial Economics; Industrial Organization; F14; F3; F4.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120490
Registros recuperados: 7
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