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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Desquilbet, Marion (1) Frahan, Bruno Henry de (1) Lavoie, Nathalie (1) Pick, Daniel H. (1) Poret, Sylvaine (1) Roe, Brian E. (1) Rojas, Christian (1) Sheldon, Ian M. (1) Tharakan, Joe (1) Wang, Shinn-Shyr (1) Zago, Angelo M. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Vertical differentiation (5) Agribusiness (2) Agricultural and Food Policy (2) Industrial Organization (2) L13 (2) Marketing (2) Agricultural Finance (1) Asymmetric information (1) Buyer market power (1) Coexistence (1) Community/Rural/Urban Development (1) Credence goods (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) D43 (1) Economic integration (1) European Union (1) F12 (1) F21 (1) Farm Management (1) Financial Economics (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Journal Article (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2008 (1) 2004 (1) 1998 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Vertical Differentiation and Credence Goods: Harmonized Labeling and Gains from International Integration AgEcon Sheldon, Ian M.; Roe, Brian E.. Using a model of vertical product differentiation, we show under what institutional circumstances welfare gains will be maximized as economies integrate and harmonize labeling and certification policies for credence goods. Specifically, we show that harmonized mandatory, exclusive discrete labeling will not maximize the gains from economic integration, i.e., the choice of labeling regime can have a negative effect on market structure if firms choose to exit, reducing the range and quality of goods in the integrated market. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Vertical differentiation; Credence goods; Harmonized labeling; Economic integration; International Relations/Trade; F12; F21; L13. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6340 Buyer Market Power and Vertically Differentiated Retailers AgEcon Wang, Shinn-Shyr; Rojas, Christian; Lavoie, Nathalie. We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Buyer market power; Vertical differentiation; Wal-Mart; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; Industrial Organization; Marketing; D43; L13; L81; M31; Q13. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57165 How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare? AgEcon Desquilbet, Marion; Poret, Sylvaine. This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effect of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcome. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their cost savings from GMO adoption. Producers of non-GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields makes its GMO content above the labeling threshold. The government may impose to GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non-GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Genetically modified organisms; Coexistence; Identity preservation; Regulation; Liability; Vertical differentiation; Law and economics; Marketing; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114757 Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects AgEcon Zago, Angelo M.; Pick, Daniel H.. This study considers the welfare impact of labeling policies of agricultural commodities with specific characteristics. Using a model of vertical differentiation, the effects on equilibrium and welfare levels are calculated. The introduction of the regulation and the emergence of two differentiated competitive markets leaves consumers and high-quality producers better off, while low-quality producers are worse off. With high costs and low quality differences, the total welfare impact of the regulation can be negative. Findings show that when high-quality producers can exercise market power, the regulation could be more easily accepted by producers, but it would have a negative effect on consumers. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Food markets; Labeling; Market power; Vertical differentiation; Welfare effects; Agricultural and Food Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31143 HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE IN THE PROCESSED FOOD SECTOR AgEcon Frahan, Bruno Henry de; Tharakan, Joe. For the first time in the food trade literature, the determinants of intra-industry trade (IIT) in horizontally differentiated products and vertically differentiated products are separately tested using the most recent theoretical models of IIT. For both 1980 and 1990, the econometric results confirm country- and industry- specific determinants proposed by these models for explaining horizontal and vertical IIT in the European processed food sector. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Intra-industry trade; Horizontal differentiation; Vertical differentiation; Processed food sector; European Union; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization. Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20903 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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